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Abstract—Malicious scripts are an important computer infec-
tion threat vector in the wild. For web-scale processing, static
analysis offers substantial computing efficiencies. We propose the
ScriptNet system for neural malicious JavaScript detection which
is based on static analysis. We use the Convoluted Partitioning of
Long Sequences (CPoLS) model, which processes Javascript files
as byte sequences. Lower layers capture the sequential nature
of these byte sequences while higher layers classify the resulting
embedding as malicious or benign. Unlike previously proposed
solutions, our model variants are trained in an end-to-end fashion
allowing discriminative training even for the sequential processing
layers. Evaluating this model on a large corpus of 212,408
JavaScript files indicates that the best performing CPoLS model
offers a 97.20% true positive rate (TPR) for the first 60K
byte subsequence at a false positive rate (FPR) of 0.50%. The
best performing CPoLS model significantly outperform several
baseline models.
I. INTRODUCTION
The detection of malicious JavaScript (JS) is important
for protecting users against modern malware attacks. Because
of its richness and its ability to automatically run on most
operating systems, malicious JavaScript is widely abused by
malware authors to infect users’ computers and mobile devices.
JavaScript is an interpreted scripting language developed by
Netscape that is often included in webpages to provide addi-
tional dynamic functionality [28]. JavaScript is often included
in malicious webpages, PDFs and email attachments. To com-
bat this growing threat, we propose ScriptNet, a novel deep
learning-based system for the detection of malicious JavaScript
files.
There are numerous challenges posed by trying to detect
malicious JavaScript. Malicious scripts often include obfusca-
tion to hide the malicious content which unpacks or decrypts
the underlying malicious script only upon execution. Compli-
cating this is the fact that the obfuscators can be used by both
benign and malware files. Curtsinger et al. [7] measured the
distributions of malicious and benign JavaScript files contain-
ing obfuscation. The authors showed that these distributions
are very similar if a file is obfuscated and concluded that
the presence of obfuscation alone cannot be used to detect
malicious JavaScript.
Another difficulty is that a large number of file encodings
(e.g., UTF-8, UTF-16, ASCII) are automatically supported by
JavaScript interpreters. Thus, individual characters in the script
may be encoded by two or more bytes. As a result, malware
script authors can use the embedding itself to attempt to hide
malicious JavaScript code [39].
While a wide range of different systems have been pro-
posed for detecting malicious executable files [9], there has
been less work in investigating malicious JavaScript. Previ-
ous JavaScript solutions include those based purely on static
analysis [25], [33]. To overcome the limitations imposed by
obfuscation, other methods [7], [39], [5] include both static
and some form of dynamic (i.e., runtime) analysis to unroll
multiple obfuscation layers. In some cases, the solution is
focused on the detection of JavaScript embedded in PDF
documents [23], [5], [27]. In addition, deep learning models
have recently been proposed for detecting system API calls in
PE files [2], [21], [29], JavaScript [37], and Powershell [15].
Including dynamic analysis allows improved detection over
the previous static analysis approaches. While the combined
static and dynamic analysis approaches can help unroll multi-
ple obfuscation layers, it can cause additional difficulties.
In some cases where latency or a computational re-
sources are problematic we would like to have an effective,
purely static analysis approach for predicting if an unknown
JavaScript file is malicious. Three important applications of
this work are large-scale, fast webpage, antimalware and
email scanning services. Search engine companies often scan
large numbers of webpages searching for drive-by downloads.
Antimalware companies may scan hundreds of thousands or
even millions of unknown files each day. Similarly, large-
scale email hosting providers often scan email attachments
to identify malicious content. To scan an individual webpage
or file, a specially instrumented virtual machine (VM) must
first be reset to a default configuration. The webpage or email
attachment is then executed, and dynamic analysis is used
to determine whether the unknown script makes any changes
to the VM. This process is time consuming and can require
vast amounts of computing resources for extremely large-scale
email services. If a script classifier can be trained to accurately
predict that a script attachment is benign based solely on fast
static analysis, this could possibly allow search and email
service providers to reduce the number of expensive dynamic
analysis performed using full instrumented VMs in the cloud.
In this study, we focus on identifying malicious JavaScript for
the Microsoft Windows Defender antimalware service.
To address these challenges, ScriptNet employs a se-
quential, deep learning model for the detection of malicious
JavaScript files based solely on static analysis. The deep
learning system allows high accuracy even in the presence of
obfuscation. We evaluate the CPoLS sequence learning model
family in the context of fully static analysis which is capable
of capturing malicious behavior in any kind of JavaScript file.
Since the system operates directly on the byte represen-
tation of characters instead of keywords, it is able to handle
the extremely large vocabulary of the entire script instead of
detecting only the key API calls [23], [27]. In ScriptNet, a Data
Preprocessing module first translates the raw JavaScript files
into a vector sequence representation. The Neural Sequential
Learning module then applies deep learning methods on the
vector sequence to derive a single vector representation of
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the entire file. In this module, we propose a novel deep
learning model model called Convoluted Partitioning of Long
Sequences (CPoLS). These models can operate on extremely
long sequences and can learn a single vector representation
of the input. The next module of ScriptNet, the Sequence
Classification Framework, then performs binary classification
on the derived vector and generates a probability pm of the
input file being malicious. Unlike earlier sequential models
that are proposed to detect malicious PE files [2], our models
are trained with end-to-end learning where all the model
parameters are learned simultaneously taking the JavaScript
file directly as the input.
Evaluating the proposed models on a large corpus of
262,200 JavaScript files, we demonstrate that the best per-
forming CPoLS model offers a true positive rate of 97.20%
for the first 60K byte subsequences at a false positive rate of
0.50%. We summarize the primary contributions of this paper
as follows:
• A comprehensive definition of a modular system
is provided for detecting the malicious nature of
JavaScript files using only the raw file content.
• A novel deep learning model is proposed for learning
from extremely long sequences.
• Strong malware detection results are demonstrated
using ScriptNet on a large corpus of JavaScript files
collected by hundreds of millions of computers run-
ning a production antimalware product. The results
show the robustness of ScriptNet on predicting the
malicious nature of JavaScript files that were obtained
in the future and were not known at the time of
training.
II. DATA COLLECTION AND DATASET GENERATION
Large labeled datasets are required to sufficiently train deep
learning systems, and constructing a dataset of malicious and
benign scripts for training ScriptNet’s models is a challenge.
When unknown JavaScript is encountered by the user during
normal activity, it is submitted to the antimalware engine for
scanning. Our antivirus partner generated the datasets utilized
in this study from JavaScript encountered by the Windows
Defender antimalware engine which was submitted to their
production file collection and processing pipeline.
Methodology: Entire JavaScript files are extracted from the
incoming flow of files input to the production pipeline. The
antimalware engine is the only source of these files in this
study which are uploaded from hundreds of millions of end
user computers. A user must provide consent (i.e., opt-in)
before their file is transmitted to the production cloud en-
vironment. In many cases, JavaScript files may be extracted
from installer packages or archives which are also processed
by the antimalware engine and input to the production pipeline.
Because we want to model how well ScriptNet would perform
in a production setting, we do not artificially insert additional
file into the datasets such as those collected from Alexa top
500 websites or by other data augmentation methods because
the production pipeline does not currently spend computational
resources doing so.
Labels: Similar to the raw script content, the labels are also
provided by the antimalware company, and the labeling process
which is used in production cannot be changed for our study.
We now describe the labeling process that was used by the
antimalware company to generate the labels.
A script is labeled as malware if it has been inspected
by our AV partner’s analysts and determined to be malicious.
In addition, the script is labeled as malicious if it has been
detected by the company’s detection signatures. Finally, a
JavaScript file is labeled as malware if eight or more other anti-
virus vendors detect it as malware. Given the huge volumes of
files that are scanned each day, it is possible that an individual
anti-malware company may mispredict in an unknown file is
malicious or benign. The threshold parameter of eight was
empirically chosen by the company after carefully selecting it
as a good tradeoff between identifying malicious scripts while
minimizing false positives.
A script is labeled as benign by a number of methods. First,
the script is considered benign if it has been labeled as benign
by an analyst or has been previously collected by a trusted
source such as being downloaded from a legitimate webpage
or signed by a trusted signer. However, if this does not provide
enough labeled benign scripts, the dataset is augmented with
lower confidence benign scripts in the production pipeline
which are not detected by the company’s scanners and cloud
detections as well as by any other trusted anti-virus vendors
for at least 30 days after our AV partner has first encountered
it in the wild.
Datasets: As described in Table I, our anti-virus partner
provided the full content of 262,200 JavaScript files which
contained 222,235 malicious and 39,965 benign scripts. For
this research, JavaScript files were subsampled from the pro-
duction pipeline from September 2017 through March 2018.
These JavaScript files were partitioned into training, validation,
and test sets containing 151,840, 45,251, and 65,109 samples,
respectively, based on the non-overlapping time periods de-
noted in the table.
For the learning phase, which is described later in the paper,
we use the training and validation sets. The training set is the
largest portion (∼ 60%) and is used to train the learning model
and update its weights. The validation set is a small portion
(∼ 15%), and is used for model parameter tuning during the
learning phase. JavaScript files in the validation set are not
present in the training set. The performance of the learning
model on the validation set helps guide the selection of the best
model. In the detection phase, we use the third partition, called
test set (∼ 25%). JavaScript files in the test set are not present
in either training or validation set. The test set, consisting of
new files, helps perform true evaluation of a trained model on
unseen data. All the evaluation metrics for our models use the
test dataset only.
III. SCRIPTNET SYSTEM DESIGN
ScriptNet is motivated by the objective of building a
system, which can predict the malicious nature of a script by
analyzing the file in the absence of any additional information.
Additionally, we want this system to be able to learn features
from the data itself without intervention from humans. In this
DataSet Start End Total Num % Num %
Date Date Malware Malware Benign Benign
Training 09/14/2017 12/28/2017 151,840 126,505 83.31 25,335 16.69
Files
Validation 12/29/2017 02/01/2018 45,251 38,693 85.51 6,558 14.49
Files
Test 02/02/2018 03/03/2018 65,109 57,037 87.60 8,072 12.40
Files
Total 09/14/2017 03/03/2018 262,200 222,235 84.76 39,965 15.24
Files
TABLE I: DataSet Statistics.
section, we describe the architecture of ScriptNet in detail
which is designed to achieve these objectives.
The ScriptNet system is comprised of multiple modules
banded together in a specific order. These modules can be
treated independently as black boxes that take a specific kind
of input and can generate a certain output, which can be used
by the following module. The high-level illustration of the
ScriptNet system is shown in Figure 1. In this section we
describe the modules, as well as the process of learning and
detection used by this system.
Data Preprocessing: The first stage of ScriptNet is to process
the raw file data and prepare it for utilization by a deep learning
model. In their raw form, the script files are simply text files
written using readable characters. The content inside script
files is in the form of programming code. This means that the
text includes operators, variable names, and other syntactical
properties. In natural language, the semantic meaning of a cer-
tain word is limited to a small space. Whereas in programming
code, words cannot be directly mapped to a limited semantic
space. Moreover, the number of words and operators can grow
infinitely as variable names do not need to follow any linguistic
limitations. Therefore, we need to represent the scripts at a
much finer level than using words.
We achieve this by interpreting the script files as byte
sequences. Using this method to read the files, we limit the
space of possible options to the number of different bytes, i.e.,
(28) = 256. The complete process of sequence processing is
also illustrated in Figure 2.
For the system to clearly identify the different bytes,
we need to provide them unique identifiers. At this stage,
therefore, we create an index to map each byte with a symbolic
identifier. Following the convention in deep learning models,
we refer to this index as the vocabulary V for the model. A
vocabulary helps maintain a one-to-one symbol mapping with
the raw data and can also be used to tie any out-of-vocabulary
items to a special symbol. For example, we introduce an extra
symbol for padding sequences to a uniform length.
With the use of this vocabulary, we can now transform the
input file into a sequence usable by the learning model. At first,
by reading the text as bytes, we get a byte sequence. Next, we
perform a lookup through the vocabulary index and represent
each byte with its symbolic representation. We refer to the
derived sequence as B, where B = [b1, b2, b3, . . .] ∀bi ∈ V
denotes a sequence of symbols bi each of which is identified
in our vocabulary V .
For learning purposes, it is possible to directly use this
symbolic representation. However, symbols serve information
at a very low level of dimensionality. When represented as
symbols, any similarity between two kinds of bytes cannot
be directly identified. In neural networks, the concept of
representations, or ’embeddings’ is extensively used for this
purpose. By representing symbols with vectors, we can in-
crease the dimensionality of the information associated with
each element. These vectors can be learned from the data itself.
The distance between these vectors also serves as a measure
of semantic similarity.
In our case, we use this concept of representations and
transform the symbolic sequence into a sequence of vectors.
The initial value of these vectors is randomly selected using
initialization methods by Glorot and Bengio [13]. During the
training phase, the vectors are updated along with the model.
Neural Sequential Learning: In our preprocessing phase,
we converted the input files into vector sequences. Since the
lengths of these files can vary, the derived sequences are also
of different length. General learning methods based on feature
vectors read fixed length vectors as input and operate on
them. For our case with more complex-shaped data, we need
to use modules that can process two-dimensional input data.
Therefore, to learn from sequences, we use advanced neural
network architectures like Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs)
and Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) [24].
RNNs operate on each vector sequentially and use both
the input at each time step of the sequence, along with the
learned vector from the previous time step, to produce the
next output. In our models, we use a memory-based variant
of RNNs known as Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) [17],
[12] neural networks.
CNNs operate by performing convolutions over a sliding
window of smaller partitions within the input. These can
operate on both sequences, as well as images. For learning
from sequences, we use one-dimensional CNNs. While mostly
used in computer vision [22], [31], CNNs have also recently
shown success in sequential learning [10], [11].
In our system, we construct Neural Sequential Learning
modules based on both LSTMs and CNNs. The objective of
this module is to capture variable-length vector sequences and
learn a vector representation from them. Intuitively, this mod-
ule is responsible for searching through the input sequence and
extracting any relevant information that can be used for final
detection. In this paper, we use the Convoluted Partitioning
of Long Sequences (CPoLS) for sequence learning. We will
describe this model in detail in the next section.
Sequence Classification Framework: Once the input file
has been processed through our data processing and neural
sequence learning modules, the input is available as a fixed-
length vector hCL. The objective at this stage is to perform the
final prediction in order to classify the input as being malicious
or benign. There are several methods of classification in
machine learning that can be used at this point. Since we use
a sequence learning module based on neural networks, we use
classification models that can also be trained using gradient
descent-based methods. Using such models, we can train our
entire learning system end-to-end. End-to-end learning means
that every weight (or coefficient) in our model can be trained
in a single process guided directly by the ground truth.
Learning Phase: The modules described above, combined
together, create the complete ScriptNet system. Since these
Learning Model
Supervised Learning
 Data Generation
Sequence Preprocessing
Raw 
Javascript 
files for 
training the 
model
Script is analyzed by 
expert processes and 
is assigned a label as 
Malicious  or Benign
Scripts are 
interpreted as byte 
sequences
 
Neural Sequential 
Learning
Script label is paired 
with the vectorized 
representation of the 
script as a sequence
Each byte gets a 
symbolic identifier, 
fixing vocabulary of 
symbols.
Sequence gets 
transformed from 
symbols to vectors
Sequence 
Classification 
Framework
Loss function
[0.95, 0.31, 0.41, ... ]
[0.09, 0.53, 0.03, ... ]
[0.04, 0.67, 0.23, ... ]
[0.95, 0.05, 0.62, ... ]
...
1
2
3
4
..
1
2
3
4
...
76
35
12
121
...
1100110
1110101
1101110
1100011
...
f
u
n
c
..
66
75
6E
63
...
Vector Sequence
Forward
Backpropagation
Sequence
La
b
el
(a) ScriptNet Training System Architecture
Trained Model
Sequence Preprocessing
Raw 
Javascript 
files
Scripts are 
interpreted as byte 
sequences
 
Neural Sequential 
Learning
Each byte gets a 
symbolic identifier, 
fixing vocabulary of 
symbols.
Sequence gets 
transformed from 
symbols to vectors
Sequence 
Classification 
Framework
Vector Sequence
Prediction
(b) ScriptNet Inference Pipeline
Fig. 1: ScriptNet system architecture for training and inference phases.
……
…………...
function sumOfTwo (number1, 
number2) {
  var sum = 0;
  sum = number1 + number2;
  console.log(sum)
   return sum
……..
………..
function delayCheck() {
if (allowDelay) {
    runControl(3);
  } else {
    runExplore();
  }
var jet=[];
……………...
      ……
……
…………...
66756E6374696F6E2073756D
4F6654776F20286E756D6265
72312C206E756D626572322
9207B0A2020766172207375
6D203D20303B0A202073756
D203D206E756D6265723120
2B206E756D626572323B0A0
A2020636F6E736F6C652E6C6
F672873756D290A20207265
7475726E2073756D
……………...
   ……
6F6974636E7566 6D7573
11110511699110117102 109117115
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[0.95, 0.05, 0.62, ... 0.48, 0.35]
[0.23, 0.89, 0.38, ... 0.27, 0.81]
[0.02, 0.47, 0.94, … 0.23, 0.93]
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Fig. 2: Overview of the Sequence Processing Module of
ScriptNet
models depend on data for training, the system goes through a
learning phase before it can be used on new files for malware
detection. Figure 1a describes the learning phase of ScriptNet.
In this phase, along with the JavaScript files, we also have
labels associated with each file, specifying them as being either
malicious or benign. The system, therefore, processes the input
file into a vector sequence, as well as generates the associated
label, to be used for training the system. The sequence vector-
label pair is then passed to the learning model.
As mentioned above, we use gradient descent-based meth-
ods to train our models. In such methods, a loss L is measured
by comparing the prediction pm generated by the learning
model and the available ground truth label τ . This loss is then
used to update the coefficients (i.e., weights) of the model.
For our objective of binary classification, we use the binary
cross-entropy loss function, which is defined as:
L = −(τ log(pm) + (1− τ)log(1− pm)) (1)
where τ is the known ground truth, pm is the predicted
probability of maliciousness, and log is the natural logarithmic
function. This process of backpropagating the loss is repeated
for the entire training dataset, for a specified number of
iterations, until the model converges to the best weights.
Detection Phase: Once the model is trained completely, it
is then available for performing detection on new, unknown
files. In the learning phase, we use each sample to improve the
learning model. Whereas in the detection phase, we use a well-
trained model to perform inference in a real deployment setup.
Figure 1b shows the detection phase version of ScriptNet.
Since the learning model takes a vector sequence as an
input, the same data preprocessing module is used in the detec-
tion phase. However, the model is now used only to generate a
probability of detection. In machine learning terminology, this
pass through the model is known as a forward pass. During a
forward pass, we only move through the model in one direction
and generate a probability pm for the input file.
End-to-End Learning: Due to the modular nature of our
system, we have the freedom to train it in different ways. While
we present neural models in this paper, the system can also
use different components from machine learning. For instance,
in the Sequence Classification Framework, we can ideally use
any classifier like an Support Vector Machine or Naive Bayes,
which may or may not support gradient-based updates.
By keeping our models in the realm of neural networks, we
are also able to utilize the concept of end-to-end learning. This
means that our system can train itself completely by just using
the input files and labels. We do not need to train different
modules individually in such a setting. The results presented
in this paper were trained using end-to-end models.
IV. MODELS
ScriptNet uses end-to-end learning models based on neural
networks. For our objectives, we need models for sequential
learning and sequence classification. In this section, we present
a detailed description of the Convoluted Partitioning of Long
Sequences (CPoLS) model. We first briefly discuss the neural
method of sequence learning and describe our motivation
behind constructing these models.
A. Sequence Learning and Limitations
Learning from sequential data is a common use case
in machine learning. Data in natural language, speech, time
series, stock prediction, and many other domains can be of
sequential nature. For sequences of very short fixed lengths,
vector based learning models like logistic regression can often
work well, by flattening the sequence into a longer single
vector. For longer sequences, RNNs, specifically LSTMs have
been popularly used and have shown exceptional results. Since
CNNs can also capture multi-dimensional data, they are often
used with sequential data.
As the length of the sequences keeps increasing, these mod-
els start experiencing different challenges. RNNs originally
experienced the vanishing and exploding gradient [3], [16]
problems when used on longer sequences. LSTMs, in particu-
lar help mitigate such problems. However, for extremely long
sequences, models directly based on the LSTM can quickly
become computationally expensive and are unable to process
the complete input. Additionally, the objective of ScriptNet
is to detect the malicious nature within a file. In natural
language data, sequences often generate a context space, within
which the semantic relationship between different objects is
more clear. For instance, in a task of detecting abusive text,
a sentence containing foul words is also semantically linked
to an abusive sentiment. The mere presence of a foul word
in a sentence cannot make it abusive. However, in malicious
JavaScript files, a file can look completely normal except for
a certain point in the file where malicious code is present.
Therefore, not only do we need to process very long files, we
also need to capture specific malicious nature hidden at any
location within the file.
Due to the limitations mentioned above and problem spe-
cific requirements, we propose these new models. The CPoLS
model can operate on extremely long sequences. We later show
in the paper, that these models also perform exceedingly well
over other proposed solutions in a similar problem space.
B. Convoluted Partitioning of Long Sequences
Convoluted Partitioning of Long Sequences (CPoLS) is
a neural model architecture designed specifically to extract
classification information hidden deep within long sequences.
In this model, we process the input sequence by splitting it into
smaller parts of fixed-length, processing them individually, and
then combining them again for further learning. The process
of CPoLS is as follows:
Step 1.: The model receives an input sequence B as a
sequence of bytes. Since the sequences are extremely long, we
pass them to the model in their symbolic form and transform
them to vectors later.
Step 2: The byte sequence B is split into a list C of small
subsequences ci ∈ C where i is the index of each partition in
C. During the split, the subsequences maintain their order.
Step 3: Next on the smaller subsequences, we perform
the lookup for transforming symbolic sequence ci into vector
sequences ei ∈ E where E is the list of vector subsequences
and i is the index of each subsequence. Following the conven-
tional neural network terminology, we refer to the layer for
this lookup as the EMBEDDING layer.
Step 4: Each of these partitions ei are now separately
processed through a module called RECURRENTCONVOLU-
TIONS, while still maintaining their overall sequential order.
Step 4.1: In RECURRENTCONVOLUTIONS, we pass each
partition ei through a one-dimensional CNN, CONV1D, which
applies multiple filters on the input sequence and generates
a tensor eχi representing the convoluted output of vector
sequence ei. The combined list of convolved partitions e
χ
i for
each subsequence ei ∈ E is referred to as Eχ.
Step 4.2: We then reduce the dimensionality of eχi by
performing a temporal max pooling operation MAXPOOL1D
on it. MAXPOOL1D takes a tensor input eχi and extracts a
vector e′i from it corresponding to the maximum values across
each dimension.
Step 5. As a result of RECURRENTCONVOLUTIONS, for
each subsequence ei, we derive a vector representation e′i.
We finally combine these vectors in order to generate a new
vector sequence E′ where each vector e′i ∈ E′ is a result of
RECURRENTCONVOLUTIONS and, therefore, consists of the
learned information from subsequence ei.
Step 6.: We now obtain a reduced-length sequence of
vectors E′. This sequence can now be processed using a
standard sequence learning approach. We, therefore, next pass
this sequence through an LSTM. In place of LSTM, we
can also use multiple stacked LSTMs, bi-directional LSTMs
(BiLSTMs), or any other RNN variants like Gated Recurrent
Units (GRUs), etc. For an input sequence E′ of length n, this
layer produces a learned sequence HL of length n but with a
different fixed dimensionality.
Step 7.: For detecting malware, we want to obtain the im-
portant malicious signal information within the sequence HL.
An effective method for such cases is the use of temporal max
pooling, MAXPOOL1D, as proposed by Pascanu et al. [29].
Given an input vector sequence S = [s0, s1, . . . sM−1] ∈ S
of length M , where each vector si ∈ RK is a K-dimensional
vector, MAXPOOL1D computes an output vector sMP ∈ RK
as sMP (k) = max(s0(k), s1(k), · · · sM−1(k))∀k ∈ K. The
vector sMP , therefore, for each dimension, contains the max-
imum value observed in the sequence for that dimension.
At this stage, we pass the sequence HL through MAX-
POOL1D to obtain the final vector hCL. The vector hCL is
the derived vector representation of the entire sequence B
using the CPoLS model. This vector can now be used by the
Sequence Classification Framework to perform the final binary
classification.
The simplest such model can be a logistic regression model
that uses hCL and derives a probability of maliciousness pm.
We can even use complex models, such as feed-forward neural
networks, or deeper neural networks with multiple layers for
the same purpose. We can also use any non-linear activation
functions in these networks. For our experiments, we use the
Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU), which is defined as:
f(x) = max(0, x) (2)
where f represents the ReLU function on an input x.
Due to the modular nature of our system, the choice of
the classifier is independent of the sequential learning method
being used. For this reason, we evaluated our models with
a large number of combinations. Along with CPoLS and
CPoLS for sequential learning, we also used a simpler LSTM-
based method. We refer to this method as using LSTM and
Max-Pooling (LaMP) based on the malware detection model
proposed by Athiwaratkun and Stokes [2]. As the name of
the model suggests, this model directly takes the vector input
sequence, and passes it through the LSTM. The sequence
of learned vectors from the LSTM is then passed through a
temporal max-pooling layer, MAXPOOL1D, in order to derive
the final vector hCL. For an input byte sequence B, LaMP can
be summarized as:
E = EMBEDDING(B)
HL = LSTM(E)
hCL = MAXPOOL1D(HL)
(3)
where EMBEDDING is the embedding lookup layer, E is the
vector sequence derived using EMBEDDING, and HL is the
output vector sequence derived from the LSTM.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed ScriptNet classifier models on the JavaScript files de-
scribed in Section II. We start by describing the experimental
setup used to generate the results. We next investigate the
performance of the different hyperparamer settings for the
CPoLS variants.
Experimental Setup: All the experiments are written in the
Python programming language using the Keras [4] deep learn-
ing library with TensorFlow [1] as the backend deep learning
framework. The models are trained and evaluated on a cluster
of NVIDIA P100 graphical processing unit (GPU) cards. The
input vocabulary size is set to 257 since the sequential input
consumed by each model is a byte stream, and an additional
symbol is used for padding shorter sequences within each
minibatch. All models are trained using a maximum of 15
Model Parameter Description Value
CPoLS TCPoLS Maximum Sequence Length 60,000
CPoLS BCPoLS Minibatch Size 50
CPoLS HCPoLS LSTM Hidden Layer Size 250
CPoLS ECPoLS Embedding Layer Size 100
CPoLS WCPoLS CNN Window Size 10
CPoLS SCPoLS CNN Window Stride 5
CPoLS FCPoLS Number of CNN Filters 100
CPoLS DCPoLS Dropout Ratio 0.5
LaMP TLaMP Maximum Sequence Length 200
LaMP BLaMP Minibatch Size 200
LaMP HLaMP LSTM Hidden Layer Size 1500
LaMP ELaMP Embedding Layer Size 50
LaMP DLaMP Dropout Ratio 0.5
TABLE II: Hyperparameter settings for the various models.
The hyperparameter settings for the CPoLS variant are identi-
cal to the CPoLS model.
epochs, but early stopping is employed if the model fully
converges before reaching the maximum number of epochs.
The Adam optimizer [20] is used to train all models.
We did hyperparameter tuning of the various input pa-
rameters for the JavaScript models, and the final settings are
summarized in Table II. To do so, we first set the other hyper-
parameters to fixed values and then vary the hyperparameter
under consideration. The best parameter setting is then set
based on the validation error rate. For example, to evaluate
different minibatch sizes for the JavaScript LaMP classifier,
we first set the LSTM’s hidden layer size HLaMP = 1500,
the embedding dimension to ELaMP = 50, the number of
LSTM layers LLaMP = 1 and the number of hidden layers in
the classifier CLaMP = 1. With these settings, we evaluate the
classification error rate on the validation set for the JavaScript
dataset.
The CPoLS model is designed to operate on the full
JavaScript sequences. However, training on the full length
sequences exhausts the memory capacity of the NVIDIA
P100s in our cluster, depending on the particular variant and
parameter settings of the model. To overcome this limitation,
we truncated the sequence length to T = 60,000 bytes for all
the CPoLS and CPoLS experiments. Similarly, we truncated
the sequences to lengths of T = 200, 1000 bytes for the LaMP
and Kolosnjaji CNN [21] baselines.
CPoLS Models: We first evaluate the performance of the
CPoLS model. Their common performance metrics, along with
the metrics of all the other models, are summarized in Table III.
These performance metrics include the accuracy, precision,
recall, F1 score, and the area under the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve (AUC). The table indicates that, in
general, most of the models perform reasonably well, although
some models clearly outperform others.
The ROC curves, which vary the FPR from 0% to 2%,
for the CPoLS model with several different combinations of
LSTM stacked layers LCPoLS and classifier hidden layers
CCPoLS , are depicted in Figure 5. Even with the truncated
JavaScript file sequences, all of the models approximate an
ideal classifier. Above a false positive rate (FPR) of 0.15%, the
best performing CPoLS model utilizes a single LSTM layer
and single classifier hidden layer, LCPoLS = 1, CCPoLS =
1. This result has several benefits. Since the model has a
fixed size, increasing the number of layers can often lead to
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Fig. 4: ROC curves for different JavaScript CPoLS models for
a maximum FPR = 100%.
overfitting the learned parameters in the model, leading to
performance degradation on model evaluation. Single layers
also help limit the number of parameters of the CPoLS model
and make it faster and more compact for deployment at scale.
We also evaluated the CPoLS architecture using the BiL-
STMs. The CPoLS-BiLSTM results are provided in Figure 6.
Baselines: We now compare the performance results of the
best performing CPoLS and CPoLS models to a number of
baseline systems summarized in Table III. The ROC curves
for all of these models are presented in Figure 7.
The LaMP model originally proposed in [2] for Windows
PE files is evaluated for this new task of detecting malicious
JavaScript. Table III indicates that we evaluated six variants
of the LaMP architecture in ScriptNet. Similarly, we imple-
mented the sequential CNN model proposed in [21], and
denoted as KOL-CNN, which is adapted for the new task
of detecting malicious JavaScript. Like [2], this sequential
KOL-CNN model was proposed to detect Windows PE files.
Model Accuracy (%) Precision (%) Recall (%) F1 AUC
CPOLS-LSTM-LR (L = 1, C = 0, T = 60K) 98.8725 98.9990 99.7212 0.9936 0.9985
CPOLS-LSTM-NN (L = 1, C = 1, T = 60K) 98.1997 98.2232 99.7492 0.9898 0.9937
CPOLS-LSTM-DNN (L = 1, C = 2, T = 60K) 98.1966 98.1135 99.8615 0.9898 0.9964
CPOLS-LSTM-LR (L = 2, C = 0, T = 60K) 99.0399 99.3888 99.5160 0.9945 0.9975
CPOLS-LSTM-NN (L = 2, C = 1, T = 60K) 98.9708 99.1626 99.6668 0.9941 0.9984
CPOLS-LSTM-DNN (L = 2, C = 2, T = 60K) 98.8771 99.1909 99.5301 0.9936 0.9981
CPOLS-BILSTM-LR (L = 1, C = 0, T = 60K) 98.5683 98.5394 99.8457 0.9919 0.9967
CPOLS-BILSTM-NN (L = 1, C = 1, T = 60K) 98.6928 98.7318 99.7896 0.9926 0.9956
CPOLS-BILSTM-DNN (L = 1, C = 2, T = 60K) 98.7035 98.8149 99.7159 0.9926 0.9969
CPOLS-BILSTM-LR (L = 2, C = 0, T = 60K) 98.7988 98.8773 99.7615 0.9932 0.9982
CPOLS-BILSTM-NN (L = 2, C = 1, T = 60K) 99.1398 99.2981 99.7229 0.9951 0.9986
CPOLS-BILSTM-DNN (L = 2, C = 2, T = 60K) 97.5530 97.4753 99.7913 0.9862 0.9969
LAMP-LSTM-LR (L = 1, C = 0, T = 200) 95.9861 96.6608 98.8321 0.9773 0.9766
LAMP-LSTM-NN (L = 1, C = 1, T = 200) 97.0138 96.9490 99.7295 0.9832 0.9892
LAMP-LSTM-DNN (L = 1, C = 2, T = 200) 96.3953 96.4409 99.5592 0.9798 0.9873
LAMP-LSTM-LR (L = 2, C = 0, T = 200) 87.5983 87.5983 100.0000 0.9339 0.5000
LAMP-LSTM-NN (L = 2, C = 1, T = 200) 94.1814 96.0273 97.3866 0.9670 0.9500
LAMP-LSTM-DNN (L = 2, C = 2, T = 200) 96.1169 97.8491 97.7151 0.9778 0.9748
SDA-LR (T = 2000) 87.6020 87.6020 100.0000 0.9339 0.5012
KOL-CNN (T = 200) 97.0753 97.4956 99.2097 0.9835 0.9853
KOL-CNN (T = 1000) 96.7446 96.8356 99.5363 0.9817 0.9851
LR - TRIGRAM (T = 60K) 97.5975 97.9394 99.3477 0.9864 0.9237
SVM - TRIGRAM (T = 60K) 97.5560 97.7683 99.4810 0.9862 0.9185
NB - TRIGRAM (T = 60K) 97.5560 97.7683 99.4810 0.9862 0.9185
TABLE III: Performance of the various models which were evaluated for this study.
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Fig. 5: ROC curves for different JavaScript CPoLS models
zoomed into a maximum FPR = 2%.
We also re-implemented the SDA-LR model [36] which uses
autoencoders to detect malicious JavaScript. We also compare
against trigrams of byte using logistic regression (LR-Trigram)
and a support vector machine (SVM-Trigram) as proposed
in [33]. Naive Bayes with trigrams is also considered.
None of these models are designed to process very long
sequences. In fact, we tried to implement the LaMP models
with length T = 1000 JavaScript bytes, but all those experi-
ments generated out of memory exceptions. We were able to
process KOL-CNN with length T = 1000 sequences. We were
also able to process length T = 2000 sequences with SDA-LR.
As indicated in Figure 7, none of these baseline models
outperformed our models on the JavaScript data files. In
particular, the SDA-LR model predicted that all the JavaScript
files in the test set were malicious for a number of variants
that we explored.
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Fig. 6: ROC curves for different JavaScript CPoLS-BiLSTM
models zoomed into a maximum FPR = 2%.
VI. RELATED WORK
JavaScript: Maiorca et al. [27] propose a static analysis-
based system to detect malicious PDF files which use features
constructed from both the content of the PDF, including
JavaScript, as well as its structure. Once these features are
extracted, the authors use a boosted decision tree trained with
the AdaBoost algorithm to detect malicious PDFs.
Cova et al. [6] use the approach of anomaly detection for
detecting malicious JavaScript code. They learn a model for
representing normal (benign) JavaScript code, and then use it
during the detection of anomalous code. They also present the
learning of specific features that helps characterize intrinsic
events of a drive-by download.
Hallaraker and Vigna [14] present an auditing system in
Mozilla for JavaScript interpreters. They provide logging and
monitoring on downloaded JavaScript, which can be integrated
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Fig. 7: ROC curves for different JavaScript models zoomed
into a maximum FPR = 2%.
with intrusion detection systems for malicious behavior detec-
tion.
In [25], Likarish et al. classify obfuscated malicious
JavaScript using several different types of classifiers includ-
ing Naive Bayes, an Alternating Decision Tree (ADTree), a
Support Vector Machine (SVM) with using the Radial Basis
Function (RBF) kernel, and the rule-based Ripper algorithm.
In their static analysis-based study, the SVM performed best
based on tokenized unigrams and bigrams chosen by feature
selection.
A PDF classifier proposed by Laskov and Sˇrndic´ [23] uses
a one-class SVM to detect malicious PDFs which contain
JavaScript code. Laskov’s system is based solely on static
analysis. The features are derived from lexical analysis of
JavaScript code extracted from the PDF files in their dataset.
Zozzle [7] proposes a mostly static approach extracting
contexts from the original JavaScript file. The system parses
these contexts to recover the abstract syntax trees (ASTs). A
Naive Bayes classifier is then trained on the features extracted
from the variables and keyword found in the ASTs.
Corona et al. [5], propose Lux0R, a system to select API
references for the detection of malicious JavaScript in PDF
documents. These references include JavaScript APIs as well
as functions, methods, keywords, and constants. The authors
propose a discriminant analysis feature selection method. The
features are then classified with an SVM, a Decision Tree
and a Random Forest model. Like ScriptNet, Lux0R performs
both static and dynamic analysis. However, they do not use
deep learning and require the extraction of the JavaScript API
references.
Wang et al. [37] use deep learning models in combination
with sparse random projections, and logistic regression. They
also present feature extraction from JavaScript code using
auto-encoders. While they use deep learning models, the
feature extraction and model architectures limit the information
extractability from JavaScript code.
Like our work, several authors have proposed different
types of static JavaScript classifiers which just analyzes the
raw script content. Shah [33] propose using a statistical n-gram
language model to detect malicious JavaScript. Our proposed
system uses an LSTM neural model for the language model
instead of the n-gram model proposed by Shah [33]. Other
papers which investigate the detection of malicious JavaScript
include [26], [32], [35], [38], [39].
Other File Types: While more research has been devoted
to detecting malicious JavaScript, partly because of its in-
clusion in malicious PDFs, only a few previous studies have
considered malicious VBScript. In [19], a conceptual graph
is first computed for VBScript files, and new malware is
detected by identifying graphs which are similar to those of
known malicious VBScript files. The method is based on
static analysis of the VBScripts. Wael et al. [34] propose a
number of different classifiers to detect malicious VBScript
including Logistic Regression, a Support Vector Machine with
an RBF kernel, a Random Forest, a Multilayer Perceptron,
and a Decision Table. The features are created based on
static analysis. The best performing classifier in their study
is the SVM. In [40], Zhao and Chen detect malicious applets,
JavaScript and VBScript based on a method which models
immunoglobulin secretion.
A number of deep learning models have been proposed for
detecting malicious PE files including [2], [8], [18], [21], [29].
In particular, a character-level CNN has been proposed for
detecting malicious PE files [2] and Powershell script files [15].
Raff et al. [30] discuss a model which is similar to CPoLS but
noted it did not work for PE files. They did not provide any
results for their model.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Malicious JavaScript detection is an important problem
facing anti-virus companies. Failure to detect a malicious
JavaScript file may result in a successful spearphishing,
ransomware, or drive-by download attack. Neural language
models have shown promising results in the detection of
malicious executable files. Similarly, we show that these types
of models can also detect malicious JavaScript files, in the
proposed ScriptNet system, with very high true positive rates
at extremely low false positive rates.
The performance results confirm that the CPoLS model
using CNN and LSTM neural layers is able to learn and
generate representations of byte sequences in the JavaScript
files. In particular, the CPoLS JavaScript malware script classi-
fication model using a single LSTM layer and a shallow neural
network layer offers the best results. Therefore, the vector
representations generated by these models capture important
sequential information from the JavaScript files. ScriptNet
extracts and uses this information to predict the malicious
intent of these files.
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